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OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
The principal issues in this appeal under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 23(f) in this antitrust action are (1) 
whether Rule 23 requires scrutiny under Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), of 
challenged expert testimony and (2) the propriety of class 
certification in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013) 
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(Comcast), which reversed Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 
F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (Behrend), after the District Court 
relied on Behrend in granting class certification. Because we 
find that the District Court had no opportunity to consider the 
implications of Comcast and hold that, if applicable, a court 
must resolve any Daubert challenges to expert testimony 
offered to demonstrate conformity with Rule 23, we vacate 
and remand.1 
 
I.2 
Plaintiffs are direct purchasers of traditional blood 
reagents, products used to test blood compatibility between 
donors and recipients, from two companies, defendants 
Immucor, Inc., which has settled with plaintiffs, and Ortho-
Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., the appellant here. Plaintiffs claim 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 15(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Rule 23(f). We review the 
grant of class certification for an abuse of discretion, which 
occurs if the certification “rests upon a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper 
application of law to fact.” In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 
“Whether an incorrect legal standard has been used is an issue 
of law to be reviewed de novo.” Id. (alteration and citation 
omitted). 
2 The District Court’s Memorandum provides a more 
detailed description of the alleged facts in this case. See In re 
Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 283 F.R.D. 222 (E.D. Pa. 
2012).  
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Ortho and Immucor violated federal antitrust law by 
conspiring to fix traditional blood reagent prices. 
 
By 1999, the entire domestic supply of traditional 
blood reagents had come under the control of Ortho and 
Immucor in a duopoly in which both companies anticipated 
they could raise their prices and increase their profits.3 In 
November 2000, Ortho and Immucor executives attended an 
annual trade meeting at which plaintiffs assert the conspiracy 
began. Soon thereafter, both Ortho and Immucor began 
increasing traditional blood reagents prices in rapid 
succession, and by 2009, many prices had risen more than 
2000%. Following a Department of Justice probe, a number 
of private suits were filed and transferred by the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to the District Court, which 
consolidated them in December 2009.  
 
Plaintiffs seek damages under the Clayton Act, see 15 
U.S.C. § 15, for alleged horizontal price fixing in violation of 
the Sherman Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 1. In July 2012, after 
preliminary approval of plaintiffs’ settlement with Immucor, 
the court held a hearing to determine whether to certify 
plaintiffs’ class of “[a]ll individuals and entities who 
purchased traditional blood reagents in the United States 
directly from Defendants Immucor, Inc., and Ortho-Clinical 
                                              
3 During the 1980s and 1990s, the traditional blood 
reagent market was highly competitive. Faced with more than 
a dozen competing companies and low profit margins, Ortho 
considered abandoning the industry while Immucor 
approached bankruptcy. At some point in the 1990s, Immucor 
began to acquire competing producers and by 1999, Immucor 
and Ortho were the only remaining firms in the U.S. market. 
 5 
 
Diagnostics, Inc. at any time from January 1, 2000 through 
the present.” 283 F.R.D. at 247. The court then certified the 
class over Ortho’s objection. We granted Ortho’s petition to 
appeal under Rule 23(f). 
 
II. 
Plaintiffs relied in part on expert testimony to produce 
their antitrust impact analyses and damages models. The 
District Court evaluated the testimony, the reliability of which 
Ortho consistently challenged, and, in part by holding that the 
testimony “could evolve to become admissible evidence” at 
trial, determined that plaintiffs had met Rule 23(b)(3)’s 
predominance requirement. See 283 F.R.D. at 243-45 
(quoting Behrend, 655 F.3d at 204 n.13). Relying on our 
decision in Behrend, the court rejected Ortho’s challenges to 
plaintiffs’ damages models as irrelevant to class certification 
because, the court reasoned,  
 
[v]irtually all of Ortho’s arguments go to the 
merits of the models [plaintiffs’ expert] has 
constructed: the question whether the models 
give rise to “a just and reasonable inference or 
[are] speculative.” Behrend, 655 F.3d at 206. 
These merits questions have some force, and 
they may prove persuasive at the summary 
judgment stage. However, they do not overlap 
with the Rule 23 requirements, because they 
neither implicate a need for individual proof nor 
convince the Court that [the] models could not 
“evolve to become admissible evidence.” Id. at 
204 n.13. 
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Blood Reagents, 283 F.R.D. at 240-41 (third alteration in 
original).  
 
On appeal, Ortho contends the trial court failed to 
rigorously scrutinize whether “questions of law or fact 
common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
In particular, pointing to Comcast, Ortho asserts the trial court 
erred by declining to address at class certification whether 
plaintiffs’ damages models were capable of producing just 
and reasonable damage estimates at trial and by accepting 
plaintiffs’ theory as capable of proving classwide antitrust 
impact.4 Ortho also argues that, under the class certification 
                                              
4 More specifically, Ortho contends that plaintiffs’ 
expert’s methodologies cannot prove antitrust impact as a 
matter of law because they are incapable of distinguishing 
lawful price increases resulting from the creation of a duopoly 
from price increases resulting from the alleged price-fixing 
conspiracy. Ortho bases this argument in part on statements in 
Comcast such as, “Prices whose level above what an expert 
deems ‘competitive’ has been caused by factors unrelated to 
an accepted theory of antitrust harm are not ‘anticompetitive’ 
in any sense relevant here,” 133 S. Ct. at 1435, and the 
suggestion that a damages model must be able “to bridge the 
differences between supra-competitive prices in general and 
supra-competitive prices attributable to” the antitrust 
violation, id. See also, e.g., id. at 1433 (stating that “a model 
purporting to serve as evidence of damages . . . must measure 
only those damages attributable to” the “theory of antitrust 
impact accepted for class-action treatment,” and those 
damages must be “susceptible of measurement across the 
entire class”); id. at 1435 (“The first step in a damages study 
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standard, the trial court should have scrutinized the plaintiffs’ 
expert’s testimony under Daubert.  
 
III. 
A. 
Because the District Court did not have the 
opportunity to consider Comcast’s later-issued guidance in 
the first instance, we will vacate the class certification order 
and remand for reconsideration. Without foreclosing what 
other conclusions the District Court might reach regarding 
Comcast’s ramifications for antitrust damages models5 or 
proving antitrust impact,6 we believe Behrend’s “could 
evolve” formulation of the Rule 23 standard did not survive 
Comcast. See Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433 (criticizing 
Behrend for “finding it unnecessary to decide ‘whether the 
[expert’s damages] methodology [was] a just and reasonable 
inference or speculative’” and indicating that such a 
methodology is not “acceptable so long as it can be applied 
classwide, no matter how arbitrary the measurements may be” 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Behrend, 655 F.3d at 
206)). As we stated in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust 
Litigation, the “proper task” of the trial court is “to consider 
carefully all relevant evidence and make a definitive 
                                                                                                     
is the translation of the legal theory of the harmful event into 
an analysis of the economic impact of that event.’” (quoting 
Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific 
Evidence 432 (3d ed. 2011))).  
5 See generally Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433-35.  
6 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
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determination that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met 
before certifying a class.” 552 F.3d 305, 320 (3d Cir. 2008). 
“Class certification requires a finding that each of the 
requirements of Rule 23 has been met,” id.; factual 
determinations “must be made by a preponderance of the 
evidence,” id. at 307. “‘[A]ctual, not presumed, conformance’ 
with the Rule 23 requirements remains necessary,” id. at 322 
(quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 
(1982)), and “[a] party’s assurance to the court that it intends 
or plans to meet the requirements is insufficient,” id. at 318.7  
 
B. 
We join certain of our sister courts to hold that a 
plaintiff cannot rely on challenged expert testimony, when 
critical to class certification, to demonstrate conformity with 
Rule 23 unless the plaintiff also demonstrates, and the trial 
court finds, that the expert testimony satisfies the standard set 
out in Daubert. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the 
class certification analysis must be “rigorous.” Comcast, 133 
S. Ct. at 1432 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)). This “rigorous analysis” applies to 
expert testimony critical to proving class certification 
                                              
7 Similarly, “[u]nder the present structure of Rule 
23(c), . . . a district court [is] no longer permitted to issue a 
‘conditional certification’ . . . because [a] trial court must 
‘make a definitive determination that the requirements of 
Rule 23 have been met before certifying a class.’” In re NFL 
Players Concussion Injury Litig., --- F.3d ---, ---, No. 14-
8103, 2014 WL 7331936, at *6 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 2014) (third 
alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320).  
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requirements. See, e.g., Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433 (citing 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551-52); Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d 
at 323. As part of the “rigorous analysis,” the Court has 
clarified, “[a] party seeking class certification must 
affirmatively demonstrate his compliance” with Rule 23. 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. This means that the party seeking 
certification must “be prepared to prove that there are in fact 
sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or 
fact, typicality of claims or defenses, and adequacy of 
representation, as required by Rule 23(a). The party must also 
satisfy through evidentiary proof at least one of the provisions 
of Rule 23(b).” Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1432 (emphasis in 
original) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Expert 
testimony that is insufficiently reliable to satisfy the Daubert 
standard cannot “prove” that the Rule 23(a) prerequisites 
have been met “in fact,” nor can it establish “through 
evidentiary proof” that Rule 23(b) is satisfied. Other courts of 
appeals have reached this conclusion. See Messner v. 
Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 
2012) (“When an expert’s report or testimony is ‘critical to 
class certification,’ we have held that a district court must 
make a conclusive ruling on any challenge to that expert’s 
qualifications or submissions before it may rule on a motion 
for class certification.” (quoting Am. Honda Motor Co. v. 
Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam))); In re 
Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 614 
(8th Cir. 2011) (approving “a focused Daubert analysis which 
scrutinized the reliability of the expert testimony in light of 
the criteria for class certification and the current state of the 
evidence”);8 see also Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 
                                              
8 We have no occasion to examine whether there might be 
some variation between the Seventh and Eighth Circuit 
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F.3d 970, 982 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing the Supreme Court’s 
dictum in Dukes and stating, “In its analysis of Costco’s 
motions to strike [expert testimony at the class certification 
stage], the district court correctly applied the evidentiary 
standard set forth in Daubert”). Furthermore, we believe the 
Supreme Court’s dictum in Dukes buttresses our decision. See 
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553-54 (“doubt[ing]” a district court’s 
“conclu[sion] that Daubert did not apply to expert testimony 
at the certification stage of class-action proceedings”).  
 
In the District Court, plaintiffs relied on expert 
testimony to produce most of their antitrust impact analyses 
and damages models, which they offered to demonstrate that 
common questions predominated over individual questions as 
required by Rule 23(b)(3). The court evaluated the expert 
testimony and, in part because it held the testimony “could 
evolve to become admissible evidence” at trial, determined 
                                                                                                     
formulations. Consistent with our holding here, both courts 
limit the Daubert inquiry to expert testimony offered to prove 
satisfaction of Rule 23’s requirements. See Zurn Pex, 644 
F.3d at 614 (approving the district court’s “focused Daubert 
analysis which scrutinized the reliability of the expert 
testimony in light of the criteria for class certification and the 
current state of the evidence”); Messner, 669 F.3d at 814 
(“[A] Daubert hearing is necessary under American Honda 
only if the witness’s opinion is ‘critical’ to class 
certification.”); Am. Honda, 600 F.3d at 816 (holding that a 
trial court must resolve challenges to an expert’s 
qualifications as well as “any challenge to the reliability of 
information provided by an expert if that information is 
relevant to establishing any of the Rule 23 requirements for 
class certification”).  
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that it satisfied Rule 23. 283 F.R.D. at 243-45 (quoting 
Behrend, 655 F.3d at 204 n.13). The court also stated that 
“[a]t the present stage of the litigation, the Court also rejects 
Ortho’s arguments regarding the reliability of plaintiffs’ 
damages models.” Id. at 243.9 
 
Because Ortho consistently challenged the reliability 
of plaintiffs’ expert’s methodologies and the sufficiency of 
his testimony to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3), we leave it to the 
District Court on remand to decide in the first instance which 
of Ortho’s reliability attacks, if any, challenge those aspects 
of plaintiffs’ expert testimony offered to satisfy Rule 23 and 
then, if necessary, to conduct a Daubert inquiry before 
assessing whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been 
met.10 
                                              
9 Plaintiffs contend Ortho waived the opportunity to bring 
a Daubert challenge. But in the trial court proceedings, Ortho 
consistently challenged the reliability of plaintiffs’ expert’s 
models and the sufficiency of his testimony to satisfy Rule 
23(b)(3). 
10 As we explained in Hydrogen Peroxide,  
[O]pinion testimony should not be uncritically 
accepted as establishing a Rule 23 requirement 
merely because the court holds the testimony 
should not be excluded, under Daubert or for 
any other reason. Under Rule 23 the district 
court must be “satisfied,” Falcon, 457 U.S. 
[147,] 161 [(1982)], or “persuaded,” [In re 
Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig.], 471 F.3d 
[24,] 41 [(2d Cir. 2006)], that each requirement 
is met before certifying a class. Like any 
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IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the class 
certification order and remand for proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
                                                                                                     
evidence, admissible expert opinion may 
persuade its audience, or it may not. This point 
is especially important to bear in mind when a 
party opposing certification offers expert 
opinion. The district court may be persuaded by 
the testimony of either (or neither) party’s 
expert with respect to whether a certification 
requirement is met. Weighing conflicting expert 
testimony at the certification stage is not only 
permissible; it may be integral to the rigorous 
analysis Rule 23 demands.  
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 323 (citations and footnote 
omitted). See also generally id. at 324 (“That weighing expert 
opinions is proper does not make it necessary in every case or 
unlimited in scope. . . . In its sound discretion, a district court 
may find it unnecessary to consider certain expert opinion 
with respect to a certification requirement, but it may not 
decline to resolve a genuine legal or factual dispute because 
of concern for an overlap with the merits.”).  
